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Fetta v. Board of Education 
by JOHN PAUL JONES 
At an unnecessarily high cost for patients who complained 
of unprofessional and sexually invasive treatment, U1e Supreme 
Comt of Virginia last fall brought down the curtain on U1e third 
of three judicial acts of review in Fetta v. Board of Medicine) 
In the end, a doctor won immunity for his misconduct and the 
Board of Medicine los t its a ttempt to revoke his license 
because it unfairly interfered with an evidentiary hearing. The 
conduct of disciplinary proceedings by licensing boards is no 
doubt better for the admonition given the Board of Medicine 
but U1e net result need not have been so distasteful. 
Dr. Patrick J. Petta had treated several women patients 
using procedures which lacked an accepted therapeutic pur-
pose and were beyond the legal scope of chiropractic medicine, 
concluded the hearing officer after a formal evidentiary hear-
ing. The hearing officer also found that the doctor had com-
mitted sexual battery on two patients. 
Tainted Evidentiary Proceeding 
Four physician members of the Board of Medicine attended 
Uuit heating, put numerous questions to witnesses and, at least 
once, offered the hearing officer an opinion on the admissibili-
ty of certain evidence. A quorum of the Board, which included 
the four doctors who had attended the evidentiary hearing, sub-
sequenUy reviewed the hearing transcript and heard arguments 
by counsel. It then voted, 14-0, to adopt U1e hearing officer 's 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, and to revoke Dr. 
Petta's license to practice chiropractic. 
Dr. Petta then appealed to ilie circuit court, claiming Ulat 
participation by Board members in Ule evidentiary hearing vio-
lated his right to a hearing conducted eiilier by the Board or by 
a heating officer. The circuit court vacated the Board's deci-
sion to revoke Dr. Petta's license and held iliat the presence of 
Board members at an evidentiary hearing assigned to a hearing 
officer was unlawful, so tainting Ule Board's subsequent deci-
sion as to warrant dismissal of the charges against Dr. Fetta.2 
Although the record made it clear that the Board doctors 
who attended the hearing were more than simply silent specta-
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tors, their presence alone was, for the circuit court, enough to 
violate the doctor's right under Section 54.1-110 which reads: 
Every hearing in a contested case shall be conducted in 
accordance with the provisions of the Administrative 
Process Act (Section 9-6.14:1 et seq.). When a hearing offi-
cer presides, the regulatory board shall determine whether 
the hearing officer is to hear the case alone or whether the 
board is to hear the case with the hearing officer. 
The circuit court found that Section 54.1-110 offered the Board 
only two options: a hearing conducted by the Board (or at least 
a quorum) or a hearing conducted by a hearing officer alone. 
The Court of Appeals affumed, finding the fatal flaw to be 
the Board's decision to detail three members to "participate 
with the hearing officer."3 The Supreme Court considered that 
only the remedy ordered by the courts below was controversial 
enough to warrant review. Saying little about participatory 
error, nevertheless, the Court affirmed the decision below. 
Three courts reached the same two conclusions. First, when 
Board members visit an evidentiary heating, ask questions, and 
offer opinions on evidence (as permitted by the presiding offi-
cer), they violate Section 54.1-110. Second, when the same 
Board members later join in the Board's deliberation, all par-
ticipating members become legally incapable of passing judg-
ment on the case. 
cessation of Presiding 
What ought to have preceded these conclusions of law is a 
finding of fact that the hearing officer stopped presiding- that 
is, directing, controlling and governing proceedings. Any find-
ing about the cessation of presiding, moreover , ought to be 1 
fmnly grounded in record evidence, i.e., in ilie transcript of the 
administrative hearing. No such findings appeared in the opin-
ions of the three courts reviewing Dr. Petta' s case. The only 
facts deemed worU1y of judicial mention were that the board 
doctors were allowed by the hearing officer to ask questions of 
the witnesses and, on at least one occasion, to offer an opinion 
on the admissibility of evidence. The former better buttresses 
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the conclusion that the hearing officer 
never stopped presiding, for, otherwise, 
how could she still be in a position to 
allow or to refuse questions by the inter-
loping board doctors? The latter proves 
nothing more than that an indulgent 
hearing officer was willing to listen. 
E lsewhere in the transcript 
lies additional evidence that the 
hearing officer never stopped 
presiding. At the outset, Dr. 
Fetta's counsel appealed to the 
hearing officer to exclude the 
intruding board doctors, and 
then abided by her decision to 
the contrary. When Dr. Fetta's 
counsel later objected to the 
Board doctors putting questions 
to witnesses, both sides accept-
ed the hearing officer's ruling 
tltat she would allow some ques-
tions by the Board doctors but 
she would control the privilege 
on a question-by-question basis. In fact, 
it was the hearing officer's own stated 
conclusion that, however the Board doc-
tors might describe their contributions, 
she con tinued to preside because she 
controlled their questions and because 
her findings of fact and conclusions of 
law would be what constrained the full 
Board's decision afterward. 
The Board doctors complied often 
enough so that the hearing officer' s 
explicit finding that she, and not they, 
presided deserves the judicial deference 
such a finding of fact is ordinarily due. 
After all, she was there at the time, and 
the judges of tlte reviewing courts were 
not. A careful reading of the transcript 
suggests that t11e Board doctors usurped 
not the presiding power of the hearing 
officer but the prosecuting duty of the 
Board's hapless counsel. 
wrong Adjudicative Event 
If the Board doctors did not preside, 
then the evid~ntiary hearing was not 
legally deficient as measured by Section 
54.1-110. The three courts focused on 
the wrong adjudicative event. All three 
recognized the harm to proper adminis-
trative decision-making which permitted 
some members of a collective decision-
making body to enter into the eviden-
tiary hearing itself while leaving others 
to settle for its printed record . But all 
three courts pointed in the wrong direc-
tion in isolating the resultant error. 
What the four Board doctors did at the 
evidentiary hearing was permissible. 
What they did at the deliberative meet-
ing afterward was not. The evidentiary 
hearing and its report could still have 
formed the basis for proper Board action 
against Dr. Fetta. 
MARCH 1993 
The Board should have excused those 
members who attended the evidentiary 
hearing from its subsequent delibera-
tions. Because the Board has 16 mem-
bers, and only four attended Dr. Fetta's 
hearing, others sufficient for the Board's 
quorum of 11 wou ld still have been 
available to pass judgment on the hear-
ing officer's report. The Board, howev-
er, did not exclude the four who had 
attended the evidentiary hearing, and the 
case did not reach court until it was too 
late for a saving judicial order to 
exclude them. 
As a federal court of appeals said in a -
leading case about federal agency deci-
sional bias, "[l]itigants are entitled to an 
impartial tribunal whether it consists of 
one man [sic] or 20 and there is no way 
which we know of whereby the influ-
ence of one upon the others can be quan-
titatively measured."4 In that case, the 
court found from a speech by the Chair 
of the Federal Trade Commission that he 
had prejudged a complaint of false 
advertising by the school, so the court 
invalidated the Commission's subse-
quent decision in which the Chair had 
participated. 
A Better Response 
What would have been a better 
response by the Virginia courts to tainted 
deliberations rather than ordering the 
Board of Medicine to dismiss the case 
permanently, leaving serious charges 
against Dr. Fetta to be ignored forever? 
Cinderella Career and Finishing 
School suggests one answer. The court 
remanded the case to the Commission for 
a new decision, directing the Commis-
sion to exclude its chair from its confer-
ence. The court apparently assumed that 
Ute other commissioners could, given a 
fresh start, produce a lawful decision 
even though Utey had once been exposed 
to their chair's biased views. The court's 
assumption was especially justified in 
Cinderella Career and Finishing School 
because the Commission's basic law 
required it to make a decision solely on 
the basis of what it found in the record 
developed in a formal evidentiary hear-
ing, and authorized the court to set aside 
a Commission decision that was not 
based on substantial evidence found in 
that record. Thus, the court could 
remand knowing it held a trump 
card should it find the Commis-
sion again improperly influ-
enced in producing a new deci-
sion respecting the appellant. 
A decision by the Board of 
Medicine to revoke a medical 
license is likewise constrained 
by the basic law. It, too, must 
be supported by substantial evi-
dence in the record produced 
after a formal evidentiary hear-
ing. A reviewing Virginia court 
would therefore have the same 
power to remand a new Board 
decision respecting Dr. Fetta's 
license if the Board's new decision was 
not adequately justified by explicit refer-
ence to the record produced at the evi-
dentiary hearing. 
Rule of Necessity 
Even if it were assumed that the other 
Board members could not be sufficiently 
rehabilitated to make another-litis time 
unbiased-decision on the record after 
once being exposed to the views of those 
who had attended the evidentiary bear-
ing, Ute Rule of Necessity offers another 
alternative for a reviewing court. By tile 
Rule of Necessity, a judge who would 
ordinarily be disqualified for bias may 
nevertlleless hear a case when there just 
is no other judge to do it. The United 
States Supreme Court traced the origins 
of the Rule back more than five centuries 
in common law and then applied it in 
United States v. Will5 to justify a federal 
court's bearing of a challenge to legisla-
tive adjustment in the compensation of 
federal judges. Kennetll Culp Davis, in 
his widely respected Administrative Law 
Treatise, wrote more than a decade ago 
tllat "[t]he doctrine is so clear that it is 
seldom litigated . . .. " Nonetlleless, there 
are numerous cases in which the Rule is 
applied, not only to judges, but to admin-
istrative board members deciding cases. 
Some are quite recent. In 1991 , for 
example, the Supreme Court of Arkansas 
applied the Rule in Acme Brick Co. v. 
Missouri Pacific R. Co. upholding an 
order by tile state's Highway Commis-
sion.6 In 1990, the Court of Appeals of 
Missouri applied it to affirm a case deci-
sion by a city council in Fitzgerald v. 
City of Maryland Heights. 7 
Reviewing Virginia courts should 
have applied the Rule in Petta if they 
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concluded that rehabilitation could not 
wipe the stain of bias even from those 
Board members who had not taken part 
in the evidentiary hearing. "It is well 
settled that where the Legislature vests 
in a particular officer or administrative 
agency the sole power of investigation 
and decision, the Legislature's purpose 
cannot be defeated by disqualification of 
the designated officer or agency on the 
ground of alleged prejudgment or bias."s 
The failure of all three courts to apply 
the rule in Fetta frustrated the will of the 
General Assembly that the Board of 
Medicine decide license revocation 
cases. The failure also injured the legiti-
mate expectations of complaining 
patients that their charges of sexual mis-
conduct would receive serious audience. 
When the Rule of Necessity is applied 
to decisions by judges, it sometimes per-
mits even the final say by a biased or 
prejudiced decider. When the Rule is 
applied to decisions by agencies, it usu-
ally bas a much less significant impact 
because of the availability of judicial 
review. Applied to the Board of Medi-
cine in Fetta, the Rule would have per-
mitted the Board no more than was per-
mitted t11e FTC in Cinderella Career and 
Finishing School, a chance to make a 
proper administrative decision-subject 
to review by the courts. Dr. Fetta would 
still have had the safeguard of review by 
the same circuit court and court of 
appeals that invalidated the Board's orig-
inal decision before permitting the Board 
(and U1e complaining patients) their sec-
ond chance. Instead, the doctor got 
court-confen·ed immunity. 
Every administrative board and 
agency empowered to decide cases is 
bound to avoid not only acting improper-
ly but also merely appearing to do so. 
That duty is not well served by a board 
which interferes with evidentiary hear-
ings after it assigns them to hearing offi-
cers . The practice surely suggests the 
board was prejudging a case not yet 
properly before it, and it surely under-
mines the authority of the officer suppos-
edly enjoying Ule board's trust and confi-
dence sufficiently to be assigned to pre-
side in its stead. Just such a practice was 
apparently well established at the Board 
of Medicine, however, and so it was high 
time that the Board be admonished. For 
this discipline, tlle three Fetta judicial 
decisions are to be applauded. For 
unnecessarily affording the doctor immu-
nity for his misconduct, however, the 
same decisions ought properly to be rued. 
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